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FIRST ENGLISH: THE FIFTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES JUST
COMPENSATION FOR A REGULATORY TAKING
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution requires the
government to pay just compensation for takings of private property.I
However, the question repeatedly has confronted the courts as to
whether compensation is constitutionally required as the remedy for
regulatory takings.2 Inherent in that question is the threshold issue of
whether a governmental regulation may ever constitute a taking under
the fifth amendment. 3 The United States Supreme Court finally an-
swered that question by holding that just compensation is constitution-
ally required for "temporary" regulatory takings. 4
1. The pertinent part of the fifth amendment provides: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V, The fourteenth amendment makes the fifth amendment applicable to
the states. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
107 S. Ct. 2378, 2383 n.4 (1987) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). It is understood generally that the just compen-
sation clause of the fifth amendment requires monetary payment equal to the
fair market value of the property taken. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse
Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973).
2. Historically, landowners looked to the courts for declaratory relief invali-
dating an allegedly excessive regulation. Gordon, Compensable Regulatory Taking:
A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation Road, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 211, 212 (1983); Johnson,
Compensation for Invalid Land Use Regulation, 15 GA. L. REV. 559 (1981). However,
landowners began to seek monetary compensation when alleging that the chal-
lenged regulation effected a taking of their property without payment of just
compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. Id. at 559-60.
3. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 646-47
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Implicit in this question [of whether govern-
ment must pay just compensation when regulation effects a taking] is the corol-
lary issue whether a government entity's exercise of its regulating police power
can ever effect a 'taking' within the meaning of the just Compensation Clause.");
see also Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction Manifesto: A
Reply to the "Gang of Five's " Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Prop-
erty, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 685, 692 (1986) (two interrelated issues to be ad-
dressed: "(1) When does regulation of private property become so severe that it
moves beyond the boundary of uncompensated police power action and be-
comes a taking . . . which requires compensation?; and (2) When a regulatory
taking has occurred, what is the aggrieved property owner's remedy?").
4. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). In First English, the Court described "temporary" regu-
latory takings as "those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by
the courts." Id. at 2383; accord San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (temporary taking covers "the period commencing on the date the reg-
ulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation" (footnotes omitted)).
The determination of a regulatory taking will result when a land-use regula-
(925)
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The debate over the appropriate remedy available to a landowner,
who successfully challenges a regulation on the grounds that it unconsti-
tutionally effects a taking of private property without payment of just
compensation, initially focused on the sufficiency of a judicial declara-
tion that the regulation was invalid.5 Some state courts maintained not
only that a declaration of invalidity was sufficient redress, but also that it
was the exclusive remedy available to an aggrieved landowner. 6 How-
ever, other courts adopted a contrary position and held that the chal-
lenger was entitled to just compensation when the excessive regulation
went so far as to constitute a taking of private property in violation of
the fifth amendment. 7 While the latter view gained support among sev-
eral of the Supreme Court Justices, others cautioned against such an
approach. Those opposed agreed that a challenger may be entitled to a
monetary remedy, but asserted that the due process clause of the four-
tion is challenged successfully as effecting a de facto taking of private property.
See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. Prior to First English, the Court found de
facto takings requiring the payment ofjust compensation to have occurred only
where the government appropriated the use of private property, thereby interfer-
ing with the landowner's physical possession, without exercising its power of
eminent domain and paying just compensation for the property interest taken.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(permanent physical occupation by cable installations authorized by government
constituted per se taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180
(1979) (navigational servitude imposed by government constituted physical in-
vasion of private marina requiring payment ofjust compensation); United States
v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947) (governmental flooding of private prop-
erty effected taking through "a continuing process of physical events").
Regulatory takings are thus distinguished from traditional takings in that
regulatory takings involve governmental restriction on the use of private property
while traditional takings involve government's physical use of private property.
5. See, e.g., San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "mere invalidation would fall far short of fulfilling the fundamental purpose
of the Just Compensation Clause").
6. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (1979) (declaratory relief or mandamus is appropriate relief for un-
constitutional regulation rather than inverse condemnation), aff'd on other
grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see also Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemna-
tion and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Con-
trols, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 47 & n.162 (1983) (California and New York courts
reluctant to award damages when taking found); Comment, Just Compensation:
The Constitutionally Required Remedy for Regulatory Takings, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237,
1245 & n.61 (1987) (discussing various approaches by state courts to remedial
question in regulatory taking cases).
7. See, e.g., Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981)
(just compensation required whenever exercise of police power effects taking)
For a discussion of Burrows, see infra note 124. See also Bauman, supra note 6, at
47 & n.163 (federal courts willing to require just compensation in land use
cases); Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 685-86 & n.3 (citing cases in six federal
courts of appeals, United States Claims Court and state supreme courts, which
adopted just compensation as remedy for regulatory takings); Comment, supra
note 6, at 1245 & nn.62-63 (noting that even states that recognize regulatory
takings differ as to appropriate remedy).
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teenth amendment8 provided this remedy rather than the just compen-
sation clause of the fifth amendment.9
During the past decade, the "remedial question" of what constitutes
the appropriate remedy for a temporary regulatory taking was before
the Court in four cases, in each of which the Court concluded that it was
unable to address the issue.' 0 However, the Court finally resolved the
question in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les." The Court answered the remedial question by holding, on the
facts of First English, that a landowner is entitled to just compensation
under the fifth amendment when a "temporary" governmental regula-
tion effects a taking of the landowner's property.' 2 However, First Eng-
lish does not address many questions relating to the regulatory takings
situation. 1 3 Nevertheless, in light of the Court's answer to the remedial
question, official land planners, landowners, observers and the judiciary
will now see whether this decision will result in the anticipated "chilling
effect" on the exercise of governmental regulatory powers 14 or whether
8. The pertinent part of the fourteenth amendment provides: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 205 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (prop-
erty owner may have damages claim based on denial of procedural rights); see
also Johnson, supra note 2, at 579-83 (appropriate constitutional tests applied to
land use regulations are substantive due process and equal protection).
10. First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2383 (1987); see MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (Court could not determine
whether taking had occurred by rejection of subdivision proposal or if county
had failed to pay just compensation without determination by planning commis-
sion on how it would apply challenged regulation to the property); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)
(claim ruled premature because respondent had neither obtained final decision
as to application of ordinance to particular property nor pursued available state
remedies); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)
(appeal dismissed in absence of final judgment by state court regarding whether
a taking had occurred and, if so, whether nonmonetary remedies were available);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (no need to determine whether
state may limit remedies available to party whose land was taken when no taking
had occurred).
11. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). For a discussion of the facts of First English, see
infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
12. Id. at 2389.
13. Significant unresolved issues include: (1) what constitutes a regulatory
taking, i.e. at what point does a governmental restriction cross the line from
being a valid exercise of the police power to being overly restrictive and effect-
ing a taking for which the fifth amendment mandates the payment of just com-
pensation, and (2) what is the appropriate measure ofjust compensation once a
regulatory taking has been found. For a discussion of these issues, see infra
notes 131-53 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377 (1979) (noting that commentators have predicted "chil-
ling effect" on municipalities' enactment of land use regulations ifjust compen-
sation must be paid when local entity's exercise of its police power exceeds
1988] NOTE
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a proper balance will be achieved among the various forces involved in
the land planning process. 15
This Note will review the historical development of the Court's in-
terpretation of the fifth amendment's applicability to governmental reg-
ulations which led to the First English decision, focusing on two specific
questions: first, may a regulatory action ever effect a taking 16 and, sec-
ond, if a regulatory action may effect a taking, does the fifth amendment
require the payment of just compensation to the landowner. 17 Finally,
this Note will analyze the Court's decision in First English and discuss the
possible short-term and long-term effects of that case on future land use
planning by official planners and developers.
II. BACKGROUND
Until First English, a majority of the Court did not reach the question
of whether just compensation is the required remedy for "temporary"
constitutional limits), aff'd on other grounds., 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see generally First
English, 107 S. Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing fears that major-
ity opinion will result in important regulations never being enacted); Sallet, Reg-
ulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a Solution
Continues, 18 URB. LAw. 635, 636 (1986) (discussing practical significance of deci-
sion that fifth amendment requires monetary compensation for effective period
of excessive land use regulation); Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Bab-
cock, The White RiverJunction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 240 (1984) [hereinafter
Williams] (urging that determination that Constitution requires payment ofjust
compensation when land use regulation effects impermissible taking "will pro-
duce timid implementation and an unwillingness to innovate [on the part of lo-
cal governments] that will weaken and substantially curtail the effectiveness of
the land use control system").
15. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661
n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting commentators' suggestion that po-
tential financial liability would lead to more rational decisionmaking involving
cost-benefit analysis of restrictions); see also Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at
752-53 (arguing that "chilling" concept "is intended to protect the individual
citizen from constitutional overreaching by the powerful government, not the
other way around").
16. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of the question whether a reg-
ulatory action may ever effect a taking, see infra notes 23-61 and accompanying
text. Although this Note will discuss how the Court has considered regulations
as effecting takings of property, it will not delve into the fundamental question-
what factually is a "regulatory taking." The First English opinion addresses the
remedial issue, but it does not aid the struggle to predict what the Court will
consider to be a taking in the regulatory context. Outside the typical physical
takings situation, whether temporary or permanent, the Court has found the an-
swer to this question to be elusive, particularly in the context of an alleged regu-
latory taking. For a discussion of appropriate tests for determining what is a
police power taking, see Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980).
17. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court Justices, prior to the First
English decision, addressed the question of whether the fifth amendment re-
quires payment of just compensation for a regulatory taking, see infra notes 62-
87 and accompanying text.
928 [Vol. 33: p. 925
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regulatory takings.' 8 A landowner desirous of challenging a regulation
under the federal Constitution was limited to seeking declaratory relief
through the courts. 19 Traditionally, the courts examined such a chal-
lenged regulation to determine whether it constituted a valid exercise of
governmental police power.2 0 When a court found that there had been
a valid exercise by the government of its regulatory powers, the court
upheld the regulation and the complainant was not entitled to any re-
lief.2 1 On the other hand, if a court determined that the government's
18. Although the Court previously invalidated a statute as effecting a taking
without compensation, the Court was not asked in that case to determine that
the statute did effect a taking requiring the payment ofjust compensation under
the fifth amendment. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In
Pennsylvania Coal, Mahon sought an injunction to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal
Company from mining under Mahon's property notwithstanding that the com-
pany had existing property and contract rights entitling it to mine the underly-
ing coal. Id. at 412. Mahon contended that such mining would remove the
property's support and cause subsidence 'of the surface and the house on it in
violation of the Kohler Act previously adopted in Pennsylvania. Id. Act of May
27, 1921, Pa. P.L. 1198 (construing Act of Pennsylvania, approved May 27,
1921, P.L. 1198). The Court denied the injunction because it found the statute
to be an excessive exercise of the state's police power to the extent that it af-
fected previously reserved rights to mine the underlying coal. Id. at 414. Penn-
sylvania Coal Company did not seek compensation from the government for an
unconstitutional regulatory taking; rather, the Company sought the Court's de-
nial of Mahon's requested injunction on the basis of the invalidity of the Act. Id.
at 412-13. Thus, the Court was not called upon to address the remedies avail-
able to the affected owner, Pennsylvania Coal Company. Id. at 412; see Williams,
supra note 14, at 208.
19. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-73, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). A land-
owner is afforded declaratory relief by way of a judicial declaration that the regu-
lation is unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid. Id.; Johnson, supra note 2, at
559.
20. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962). The Court
stated:
The term 'police power' connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of
public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitu-
tion of the familiar standard of 'reasonableness,' this Court has gener-
ally refrained from announcing any specific criteria. The classic
statement of the rule ... is still valid today: 'To justify the state in ...
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first,
that the interests of the public ... require such interference; and, sec-
ond, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.'
Id. (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
The term "police power" also has been described as the right of the states
to regulate their internal affairs for the protection of "the health, morals, and
safety of their people by regulations that do not interfere with the execution of
the powers of general government, or violate rights secured by the Constitution
of the United States." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659 (1887).
21. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Goldblatt Court
upheld the town's ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating within the
town's limits, which the town adopted allegedly as a safety measure. Id. at 595-
96. Although the record provided the Court with little evidence on which to
evaluate the reasonableness of the ordinance, the Court held that the ordinance
5
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actions went beyond the scope of its regulatory powers, the court invali-
dated the regulation as an unconstitutional exercise of the government's
police powers. However, the court did not deem such a regulation to be
a taking requiring the payment of just compensation under the fifth
amendment; invalidation of the regulation was the extent of the com-
plainant's remedies.
22
A. May a Regulatory Action Effect a Taking?
Although the Court had not treated a regulation as having effected
a taking for purposes of the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment, it did anticipate that a regulation could constitute a taking. 2 3 In its
discussions, the Court frequently quoted the following statement from
was valid because the appellant, Goldblatt, had failed to meet its burden of
proof on the reasonableness issue. Id. Given Goldblatt's failure to meet this
burden of proof, the Court presumed that the ordinance was passed in the inter-
est of public safety. Id. at 596 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520,
529 (1959) (exercise of police power is presumed to be constitutionally valid);
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954) (presumption of reasonableness
is with the State); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1938) (exercise of police power will be upheld if any state of facts, either known
or which could be reasonably assumed, affords support for it); see also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (upholding
Pennsylvania statute protecting surface land which may be affected by the min-
ing of bituminous coal on theory that Pennsylvania has substantial and legiti-
mate public interest in preventing subsidence damage to public or inhabited
properties); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(upholding New York' City's Landmarks Law because imposed restrictions pro-
moted public's general welfare); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance that bears rational relation to health
and safety of community); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (uphold-
ing Los Angeles zoning ordinance that prohibited continuation of brickmaking
in area that had become residential); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
(upholding Kansas statute that prohibited manufacture of intoxicating liquors).
22. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). However, as noted previously,
compensatory relief was not sought in Pennsylvania Coal. See supra note 18. In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court concluded with an observation that the state could
proceed under its power of eminent domain assuming that an exigency existed
upon which the statute was passed in the first place. Id. at 416. This observation
has led many to debate whetherJustice Holmes' Pennsylvania Coal opinion meant
that the statute did effect an unconstitutional taking or merely that the statute
was invalid since it was an overly restrictive exercise of governmental police
powers. Williams, supra note 14, at 211-12 & nn.58-62 (arguing that Justice
Holmes did not mean that excessive regulation constituted taking for which just
compensation is required).
23. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court had considered a challenge to a Kansas statute which prohibited the man-
ufacture of intoxicating liquors, and had dismissed any contention that the case
should be governed by eminent domain principles. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887). In Mugler, the Court expressly stated: "A prohibition simply upon
the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just
sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public bene-
fit." Id. at 668-69. For a commentary on the opposite approaches to the appro-
930
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Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:24 "The gen-
eral rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 2 5
When a "regulation goes too far" is not easily ascertained and the Court
has recognized that there is no "set formula" to determine what consti-
tutes a regulatory taking. 2 6 Without the aid of a clear definition, the
Court has considered several factors when asked to declare that a regu-
lation constituted a taking under the fifth amendment.
27
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 28 the Court was
confronted with an allegation that New York City's Landmarks Preserva-
tion Law (Landmarks Law) 29 effected a taking of Penn Central's prop-
erty without payment of just compensation as required by the fifth
amendment. 30 Penn Central sought a declaratory judgment to prevent
priate remedy for regulatory excesses discussed by the Court in Mugler and
Pennsylvania Coal, see Bauman, supra note 6, at 33-49.
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a discussion of the facts of Pennsylvania Coal,
see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 415. Thejudiciary as well as commentators view this statement as
the source of arguments advocating the payment of just compensation as the
appropriate constitutional remedy for regulatory takings. See, e.g., First English,
107 S. Ct. at 2386; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
649 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bauman, supra note 6, at 32; Gordon, supra
note 2, at 214. But see Williams, supra note 14, at 208-12 & n.57 (urging that
Justice Holmes used "taking" in metaphorical sense rather than literally, so that
quoted statement cannot be source of just compensation remedy for excessive
regulations).
26. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (recognizing that
"[flormulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings" to deter-
mine when takings clause of fifth amendment requires compensation); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (characteriz-
ing Court's review of alleged regulatory takings as "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries"); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (expressly stating
that "[tihere is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins"); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)
(reflecting that Court traditionally has "treated the issue as to whether a particu-
lar governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as being a ques-
tion properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case"); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("An attempt to define [the police power's]
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own
facts.").
27. The Court discussed the factors it considered to be relevant in Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a discussion
of those factors, see infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
28. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
29. Id. at 109 (citing N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976)).
New York adopted the Landmarks Law in 1965 to protect physically its historic
properties and thereby to promote the well-being of its citizens and visitors. Id.
at 108-09. As part of its administration of the Landmarks Law, the Landmarks
Preservation Commission designated Penn Central's terminal a "landmark" in
1967 over Penn Central's opposition. Id. at 115-16.
30. Id. at 122. The Landmarks Law, which places special restrictions on
landmark properties, applied to Penn Central's Grand Central Terminal in Man-
hattan over which Penn Central planned the erection of a more than 50-story
7
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the use of the Landmarks Law as an obstacle to construction of an office
tower over Penn Central's property, as well as just compensation for the
taking of its property from the date it was designated a landmark prop-
erty until the date the declaratory judgment would remove the restric-
tions under the Landmarks Law as an impediment to the construction. 3 '
The issues before the United States Supreme Court were whether the
Landmarks Law effected a taking and, if so, whether the transferable de-
velopment rights available to Penn Central satisfied the demand for just
compensation under the fifth amendment. 3 2 Because the Court deter-
mined that a taking had not occurred, it did not reach the remedial
question.33
In its analysis of the Landmarks Law as applied to Penn Central's
Grand Central Terminal, the Court focused on whether it was fair and
just to impose on some people or entities restrictions on the develop-
ment of their property for the benefit of others.3 4 The Court identified
office building. Id. at 116-17. Several months after the designation of Grand
Central Terminal as a landmark property, Penn Central entered into a lease and
sublease agreement with UGP Properties, Inc., a United Kingdom corporation,
pursuant to which UGP Properties, Inc. was to construct a multi-story building
above Grand Central Terminal. Id. at 116. The Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission, which was empowered to administer the Landmarks Law, denied ap-
proval of the construction plans, stating that" 'to balance a 55-story office tower
above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic
joke. Quite simply, the tower would... reduce the Landmark itself to the status
of a curiosity.' " Id. at 117-18 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 119. Thus, Penn Central claimed that the period of the temporary
taking began on the designation date of August 2, 1967, rather than the subse-
quent date on which the Commission denied approval of the construction plans.
Id. at 119; cf San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing period of temporary taking as "com-
mencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the
date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regula-
tion" (footnotes omitted)). The issue of how to determine when a regulatory
taking commences remains unresolved. For a discussion of this issue, see infra
notes 65 & 150 and accompanying text.
32. 438 U.S. at 122. Transferable development rights arose under New
York City's zoning laws, which permitted an owner who had not developed
property to the full extent under the applicable zoning laws to transfer those
unused development rights to contiguous parcels within the same city block. Id.
at 113-14. The Court concluded that the value of being able to transfer the
development rights to other parcels within the vicinity of Grand Central Termi-
nal mitigated whatever burden the Landmarks Law imposed on Penn Central's
property. Id. at 137. However, the dissenters, who determined that the
Landmarks Law had effected a compensable taking, argued that the judicial rec-
ord did not support any conclusion that the transferable development rights
fully constituted the just compensation required under the fifth amendment. Id.
at 150-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 122.
34. Id. at 123-24. A prior taking case involving materialmen's rights to ac-
quire liens against uncompleted boat hulls guided the Penn Central Court to con-
sider factors founded on principles of fairness and justice. Id. (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)). The Armstrong case involved
the government's acquisition of navy personnel boats before completion by the
932 [Vol. 33: p. 925
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the factors relevant to this inquiry as "[t]he economic impact of the reg-
ulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regula-
tion has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" and
"the character of the governmental action."'3 5 The Court concluded
defaulting builder. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41 (1960). The
suppliers of materials for construction of the boats asserted that the govern-
ment's acquisition of the boats effected a taking of the materialmen's compensa-
ble property interests in the boats. Id. at 41-42. Their compensable property
interests derived from the materialmen's liens on the hulls and materials before
they were transferred by the defaulting builder to the government. Id. The ma-
terialmen claimed the government's acquisition made their liens unenforceable
since laborers and materialmen cannot acquire liens on a "public work". Id.
The Court determined that "[t]he total destruction by the Government of all
value of these liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible
element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking' and is not a mere 'consequential inci-
dence' of a valid regulatory measure." Id. at 48. The Armstrong Court concluded
with a recognition that "[t]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in allfairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. at
49 (emphasis added).
35. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Although one of these factors may point
to the conclusion that a taking has occurred, the Court noted that such a conclu-
sion is not the necessary result. Id. This has been demonstrated by the Court's
decisions to uphold regulations, notwithstanding their adverse impact on real
property interests, when such regulations serve to promote the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. Id. at 125; see, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding safety regulation restricting dredging and pit
excavating within city's limits as constitutional notwithstanding that it may de-
prive landowner of most beneficial use of property); United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (upholding governmental order di-
recting closing of gold mines as essential to war effort notwithstanding detri-
mental economic impact on mine owners); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding general validity of zoning ordinance when
public interest justifications support it notwithstanding development restrictions
some people will face); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding
zoning ordinance as protecting public from a harmful use notwithstanding eco-
nomic burden it imposes on owner).
However, four years after Penn Central, the Court explicitly stated that the
character of the governmental action may be determinative when analyzing a
taking challenge. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 426 (1982). The challenged statute, enacted by the State of New York,
authorized the installation of cable television lines on apartment buildings and
prohibited landlords from demanding any payments from tenants or the cable
company in excess of the one-time one dollar payment determined to be reason-
able by the State Commission on Cable Television. Id. at 423-24. Focusing its
review on the character of the governmental action, the Court acknowledged the
distinctions made "between a permanent physical occupation, a physical inva-
sion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of
property." Id. at 430. The Court emphasized that permanent physical occupa-
tions are different and warrant special treatment because appropriation of pri-
vate property "is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's
property interest." Id. at 435. This view led the Court to adopt a bright line per
se rule that a taking occurs "when the 'character of the governmental action' ...
is a permanent physical occupation of property ... without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
9
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that the Landmarks Law as applied to Penn Central's Grand Central
Terminal had not effected a taking3 6 because (a) it did not interfere with
Penn Central's expectation of operating the site as a railroad station so
that, even under the Landmarks Law, Penn Central still could obtain a
reasonable return on its investment 3 7 and (b) the Landmarks Law was
merely a restriction on use rather than a denial of all use.38 The Court
reasoned that "[t]he restrictions imposed are substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable benefi-
cial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities fur-
ther to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other
properties."
3 9
Two years after Penn Central, the Court again faced the two-pronged
issue involved in an alleged regulatory taking in the case ofAgins v. City
of Tiburon.4° Donald and Bonnie Agins owned five acres of unimproved
land in Tiburon, Marin County, California when Tiburon adopted zon-
ing ordinances that would limit any development of the Aginses' land. 4 '
impact on the owner." Id. at 434-35 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the challenged law effected a taking by authorizing a third party
to permanently and physically occupy private property. Id. at 438.
36. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
37. Id. at 129.
38. Id. at 137.
39. Id. at 138. In Penn Central, the Court determined that the "general wel-
fare" promoted by the Landmarks Law and protected by the Court's decision
was an intangible-the public's aesthetic well-being. Id. at 108-12. The Court
found the public interest justification for the restrictions on the use of private
property in the Landmarks Law's protection of the public's sense of history and
visually valued properties. Id. at 108-12, 138.
A post-First English case again presented the Court with the taking issue in-
volving the public's aesthetic well-being in the context of a physical intrusion on
private property authorized by governmental action. Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). Nollan involved the issuance of a
building permit to the owners of beachfront property on the condition that the
owners allow a public easement across a portion of their beach property as a
means of access between two public beaches on either side of the Nollans' prop-
erty. Id. at 3143. The Coastal Commission attempted to impose this condition
as a means of "protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the pub-
lic in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a
developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches." Id. at
3147. However, contrary to the Court's conclusion in Penn Central that the
Landmarks Law did not effect a taking because it promoted the state's legitimate
concern for the public's aesthetic well-being, the Court determined in Nollan
that the imposition of the condition for the public's aesthetic well-being consti-
tuted "the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose,
but without payment of compensation." Id. at 3148. The Nollan Court held that,
if California wished to advance the public interest in visual and physical access to
the beach across the Nollans' property, it could do so by exercising its power of
eminent domain and compensating the Nollans for taking an easement across
their property. Id. at 3150.
40. 447 U.S. 255 (1980), aff'g, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979).
41. 447 U.S. at 257. In response to a state requirement that the city pre-
934 [Vol. 33: p. 925
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The California Supreme Court rejected the Aginses' contention that an
excessive exercise of the police power by a local government amounted
to the taking of private property for which the fifth amendment requires
the payment ofjust compensation.4 2 Instead, the court opined that the
only remedies available to a landowner challenging a local entity's exer-
cise of its police power are to seek declaratory relief or mandamus to
invalidate the regulation. 43 The California court gave considerable
weight to policy considerations relevant to the land use planning pro-
cess, stating: "In combination, the need for preserving a degree of freedom in
the land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial force which inheres in
the inverse condemnation remedy, persuade us that on balance mandamus or
declaratory relief rather than inverse condemnation is the appropriate
relief under the circumstances. ' 44 After expressing its opinion on the
pare a general plan for land use and open space, the city of Tiburon adopted
zoning ordinances which limited development of the Aginses' five acres to be-
tween one and five single-family residences, accessory buildings and open-space
uses. Id. After the city adopted the ordinance, the Aginses did not seek ap-
proval for any use or improvement of their land; instead, they instituted suit
against the City of Tiburon seeking $2,000,000 under a claim in inverse con-
demnation and seeking declaratory relief based on their claim that the zoning
ordinance constituted an unconstitutional taking of their property without just
compensation. Id. at 257-58.
42. 24 Cal. 3d at 272, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
43. The court also admonished that a landowner has no right to sue in in-
verse condemnation when such a suit would have the effect of converting an
invalid regulation into a lawful taking for which compensation must be paid. Id.
Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a government entity which a
landowner may institute to recover just compensation for an alleged de facto
taking of the landowner's property resulting from governmental action that does
not involve formal condemnation proceedings. Agins, 447 U.S. at 258 n.2. In-
verse condemnation is distinguished from the power of eminent domain pursu-
ant to which the government formally condemns private property for public use
and compensates the landowner for the property taken. San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Agins, 447 U.S. at 258 n.2; United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
For a discussion of inverse condemnation, see Bauman, supra note 6, at 44-49;
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q
491, 495-99 (1981).
44. 24 Cal. 3d at 276-78, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (emphasis
added). In considering the policies governing its decision, the California
Supreme Court relied on the opinion issued by the United States Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 24 Cal. 3d
at 275, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377. At issue in Euclid was the constitu-
tional validity of a comprehensive zoning plan that divided the village into six
classes of use districts. 272 U.S. at 379-84. An owner of a 68-acre tract chal-
lenged the plan's validity as violative of the fourteenth amendment by depriving
the complainant of due process and equal protection of the law. Id. at 379, 384.
The Court rejected the landowner's claim and denied the injunction sought
against enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at 396-97. Recognizing the changes
in concentrations of people and modes of transportation, the Court saw a need
to preserve a "degree of elasticity" in the application of constitutional principles
"for while the meaning of corisiitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different condi-
1988] NOTE 935
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remedial question, the California Supreme Court held that the zoning
ordinances were not unconstitutional because they had not deprived the
Aginses of "substantially all reasonable use of [their] property." 45
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California that the zoning ordinances, on their face,
did not effect a taking of the Aginses' property without just compensa-
tion. 46 The Court declared that a regulation "effects a taking if the ordi-
nance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ...or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."'4 7 Applying these
tests to the zoning law as applied to the Aginses' property, the Court
concluded that the ordinances did not effect a compensable taking.
4 8
tions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a chang-
ing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise." Id. at 387.
In addition to the policy considerations, the California Supreme Court in
Agins also expressed its concern for separation of power issues by noting com-
mentators' opinion that:
'Determining that a particular land-use control requires compensation
is an appropriate function of the judiciary, whose function includes pro-
tection of individuals against excesses of government. But it seems a
usurpation of legislative power for a court to force compensation. In-
validation, rather than forced compensation, would seem to be the
more expedient means of remedying legislative excesses.'
24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (quoting Fulham &
Scharf, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning
Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1450-51 (1974)).
45. 24 Cal. 3d at 276-78, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
46. 447 U.S. at 259.
47. Id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)). In
Agins, the Court expressed these tests for a regulatory taking as being two in-
dependent tests: either the regulation did not substantially further legitimate
governmental interests or it denied the owner economically viable use of his pri-
vate property. However, when the Court applied these tests in later cases chal-
lenging governmental restrictions on uses of property, it approached them as
two prongs of a single test. See Nollan v. California Coastal Cmm'n, 107 S. Ct.
3141 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232
(1987). Once it determined in Nollan that the governmental issuance of a build-
ing permit conditioned on the grant of a public access easement across private
property did not substantially advance legitimate state interests, the Court found
grounds to support the taking challenge and did not proceed to analyze what the
economic impact of the condition would be on the Nollans. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at
3148. In Keystone, the Court also viewed the two prongs together under an anal-
ysis that required a weighing of the governmental interest being advanced
against the economic impact of the regulation on the private landowner. Key-
stone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246. The Keystone Court upheld the challenged statute since
the Court found the governmental interest, which was reflected in the statute as
the prevention of subsidence, to be substantial while the challengers had failed
to demonstrate that the statute had a material effect on their economic expecta-
tions. Id. at 1242-51.
48. 447 U.S. at 263. The Court determined that the subject zoning ordi-
nances advanced legitimate purposes of the State of California, specifically the
protection of "the residents of Tiburon from the ill effects of urbanization" and
it reasoned that, since the Aginses had not yet submitted a development plan for
approval by the local officials, there was no basis for any claim that the zoning
[Vol. 33: p. 925936
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Therefore, the Court had no occasion to address the California Supreme
Court's opinion that the remedies available for an alleged regulatory
taking are limited to mandamus or declaratory relief.4 9
Although the concept that a regulation may constitute a taking
stems from Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, the issue of
whether a temporary regulation could constitute a taking requiring the
payment ofjust compensation was not addressed until Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.5 0
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (the Company) had assembled tracts
of vacant land in San Diego, California as a possible site for a nuclear
power plant. 5 1 Seven years later, but before the Company had devel-
oped the tracts, the city rezoned the property. 52 The Company brought
an action 53 alleging an unconstitutional taking without just compensa-
tion on the theory that the city's actions had deprived it of the entire
beneficial use of its property. 54 The case ultimately was dismissed by
ordinances denied the Aginses all use of their property. Id. at 261-63. Because
the Aginses had not submitted a development plan and because they were still
free to do so, they could not establish that the zoning ordinance denied them
their reasonable investment expectations. Id. In fact, the effect of application of
the zoning ordinance as to their property was unknown. Id. Therefore, their
taking claim was premature. Id. at 260.
49. Id. at 263.
50. 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, as Justice
Brennan pointed out, prior to San Diego "the Court has recognized in passing
the vitality of the general principle that regulation can effect a Fifth Amendment
'taking.' " Id. at 648; accordAgins, 447 U.S. 255, 260 ("The application of a gen-
eral zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interest ... or denies an owner economi-
cally viable use of his land .... ." (citations omitted)); Prune Yard Shopping
Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("It is, of course, well established that
a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on
private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without
just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provision.");
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) ("Whether a statute or
regulation that went so far amounted to a 'taking,' however, is an entirely sepa-
rate question."); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978) ("It is, of course, implicit in Goldblatt that a use restriction on real
property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation
of a substantial public purpose .... ") (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962)); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958) ("Traditionally, [the Court has] treated the issue as to whether a particu-
lar governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as being a ques-
tion properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case.").
51. 450 U.S. at 624. The city's master plan adopted in the year following
the Company's acquisition of the land designated almost all of the subject land
for industrial use. Id.
52. Id. at 624-25. The city downgraded the zoning for part of the Com-
pany's land and established a plan for open space that included another portion
of the Company's property. Id.
53. Id. at 626. The Company sought mandamus, declaratory relief and
$6,150,000 in inverse condemnation. Id.
54. Id. The trial court found that the city's rezoning effected an unconstitu-
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the United States Supreme Court.55 A majority determined that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the remedial question since the state
court had not reached a final decision as to whether the city's actions in
fact had effected a taking. 56
In dissent, however, Justice Brennan addressed the merits of the
case. 57 He asserted that, once a regulatory taking is established, the du-
ration of the regulation is irrelevant. 58 He based this assertion on prior
decisions involving physical takings of limited duration 59 in which the
Court determined that the duration of a temporary physical taking is
irrelevant to the question of whether a taking has occurred. 60 Justice
tional taking because it deprived the Company of all practical, beneficial or eco-
nomic use of the property. Id. at 626-27. Thus, the United States and California
Constitutions required the payment of just compensation. Id. However, the
trial court's findings did not withstand the ensuing appeals.
55. Id. at 633.
56. Id. The Court looked to a federal statute for guidance regarding the
Court's jurisdiction. Id. at 630-31 n.10 (citing Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982)).
Section 1257 grants the Court jurisdiction to review only "[f]inal judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had." 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). The absence of a final judgment precluded the
majority's consideration of San Diego on its merits. 450 U.S. at 633.
57. 450 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan determined
that the state court had made a final judgment that no taking had occurred so
that no payment of just compensation was required. Id. at 644-46 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
58. Id. at 657-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan expressly
stated: "The fact that a regulatory 'taking' may be temporary, by virtue of the
government's power to rescind or amend the regulation, does not make it any
less of a constitutional 'taking.' Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause sug-
gests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable." Id. at 657 (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
59. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Throughout his dissent, Justice Brennan
emphasized the similarities of regulatory takings and other takings. Id. at 651-60
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Other taking situations include those discussed in
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (formal condemnation proceedings initi-
ated by government prior to taking possession), Danforth v. United States, 308
U.S. 271 (1939) (same) and United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980) (action
in inverse condemnation initiated by landowner after government takes posses-
sion). Justice Brennan noted that the Court previously recognized takings which
fell outside the easily identifiable takings situations when a government exer-
cises its power of eminent domain through formal condemnation proceedings.
San Diego, 450 U.S. at 651-52 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S.
26; Danforth, 308 U.S. 271.
60. See, eg., United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958) (discussing prop-
osition that if government enters into possession of private property and later
abandons its project, government is still liable for payment ofjust compensation
for period of temporary use and occupation); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (government must pay compensation for its physical
possession of laundry plant during World War II); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) (government's low altitude flights deprived landowner of use of
his land for raising chickens and so diminished land's value that government
must pay just compensation for easement it took through landowner's air space);
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (government liable for
compensation due tenants for value of their leasehold interests taken during
14
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Brennan argued that the Court's recognition of what constitutes a taking
under the fifth amendment should be expanded to include a taking, even
one of limited duration, effected by an excessive exercise of the govern-
ment's regulatory powers. 6 1
B. If a Regulatory Action May and Does Effect a Taking, Is Just
Compensation the Constitutionally Required Remedy
Under the Fifth Amendment?
Although the Court did not reach the remedial question in San Diego
because there was no final judgment on the preliminary taking issue,
Justice Brennan, in dissent, did address the compensation issue. 6 2 Jus-
tice Brennan recognized that mere invalidation of an excessive regula-
tion is neither an adequate remedy for the landowner who already has
suffered a loss by reason of the taking nor does it satisfy the purposes of
the just compensation clause. 63 He argued that the temporary character
of a regulatory taking does not make the fifth amendment's requirement
of compensation for the time of the taking any less obligatory.6 4 In Jus-
tice Brennan's view the Constitution mandates the payment ofjust com-
pensation for regulatory takings, and that mandate cannot be avoided
on the basis of policy concerns for freedom in the land-use planning
function and against the inhibiting financial element inherent in the in-
verse condemnation remedy which were expressed by the California
Supreme Court in Agins. 6 5 Given Justice Brennan's view of the similari-
ties between regulatory takings and takings by which the government
World War II); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)(government must pay just compensation for temporary use of specially
equipped warehouse during World War II).
61. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
recognized that "[p]olice power regulations such as zoning ordinances and
other land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in
order to promote the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation or
physical invasion of property." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 646-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a critical analysis of Justice
Brennan's dissent, see Bauman, supra note 6, at 84, 91-99; Berger & Kanner,
supra note 3; Williams, supra note 14.
63. 450 U.S. at 655-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, the tone of Justice Bren-
nan's dissent seems to derive from his incredulity at the extensive freedom en-
joyed by official land planners in practice. See Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at
697-703; Williams, supra note 14, at 197-202. Justice Brennan viewed the ele-
ment of freedom as weighing too heavily in favor of officials and too lightly in
favor of developers. 450 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's
sense of outrage at the injustice rendered to the landowner by mere invalidation
of a regulation that effects a taking is an undercurrent throughout his dissent.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He expressly addressed these concerns in a
footnote:
Invalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent unconstitu-
tional regulations by the government entity. At the 1974 annual con-
ference of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in
1988] NOTE 939
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intrudes on private property, "[o]rdinary principles determining the
proper measure of just compensation, regularly applied in cases of per-
manent and temporary 'takings' involving formal condemnation pro-
ceedings, occupations, and physical invasions, should provide guidance
to the courts in the award of compensation for a regulatory 'taking.' ,,66
Indicating the importance of the appropriate remedy to landowners
as well as the judiciary, the remedial question came before the Court in
two additional cases 6 7 before finally being answered in First English.
California, a California City Attorney gave fellow City Attorneys the fol-
lowing advice:
'IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND
START OVER AGAIN.
If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive
a claim attacking the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose,
don't worry about it. All is not lost. One of the extra "goodies" con-
tained in the recent [California] Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of
San Buenaventura, 10 C.3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, [109 Cal. Rptr. 799] ap-
pears to allow the City to change the regulation in question, even after
trial and judgment, make it more reasonable, more restrictive, or
whatever, and everybody starts over again.
See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose
the battle and still win the war. Good Luck.'
Id. at 655-56 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
66. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 658-59 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Many have criti-
cized Justice Brennan's cursory treatment of the measure of compensation for
regulatory takings. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL
OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 134 (2d ed. 1985). Initially, one must determine when
the regulation first effected a taking. See San Diego, 450 U.S. at 653-54 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). However, unlike a taking involving governmental appropriation
of property, the date on which a regulatory taking begins is not clear. D.
MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, supra at 135. Is it when any of the following
occur: "[W]hen the regulation was first adopted? When the landowner initially
asks the public body for relief from the restrictions? When the public body re-
fuses? When the complaint is filed? When the regulation is judicially deter-
mined to be a 'taking?'" Williams, supra note 14, at 223. Once the
commencement date is determined, then the temporary taking period can be
determined with the ending date being "the date the government entity chooses
to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation." San Diego, 450 U.S. at 653 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Assuming that the period of the temporary taking can be established, the
next question is what is the appropriate measure of just compensation due the
landowner. The "ordinary principles" suggested by Justice Brennan for gui-
dance require the payment of compensation equal to the fair market value of the
property taken. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States,
409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973). "That might be option or rental value .... [or]
the landowner's lost opportunity cost." Williams, supra note 14, at 223. For a
discussion of formulas to determine just compensation for regulatory takings
offered by some commentators, see D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, supra at
134-35. Justice Brennan left open this issue in his San Diego dissent and it re-
mains unresolved after First English. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying
text.
67. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985), MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561
940
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First, in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,6 8
(1986). Both Williamson County and MacDonald presented the possibility of
awarding an aggrieved landowner money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an
alternative to just compensation under the fifth amendment; however, the lack
of a ripe claim in each of these cases prevented the Court from reaching the
remedial question again. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Co-
lumbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Section 1983 provides landowners with a statutory right of action against
local governments allegedly engaging in improper land use regulation in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. First English, 107 S.
Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 205 (Stevens,
J., concurring); San Diego, 450 U.S. at 656 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
due process clause can offer the landowner protection not available under the
fifth amendment, as, for example, when governmental action interferes with in-
vestment-backed expectations without going so far as to take private property.
Carlisle, The Section 1983 Land Use Case: Justice Stevens and the Hunt for the Taking
Quark, 16 STETSON L. REV. 565, 597-601 (1987), reprinted in TAKINGS, SECTION
1983 AND LAND USE DISPUTES 19, 51-55 (Prentice Hall Law & Business 1988)
(seminar). For general discussions of the remedies available under section
1983, see D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 65, at 136-41 & Supp.
1987 at 88-90; TAKINGS, SECTION 1983 AND LAND USE DISPUTES (Prentice Hall
Law & Business 1988) (seminar).
The landowner in Williamson County brought its claim in federal court under
section 1983 alleging a taking of its property without just compensation and an
invalid exercise of the governmental police power in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 473 U.S. at 172. Williamson County is thus distinguished from First
English, MacDonald, Agins and San Diego, which all went to the Court from the
state courts in California. Of those cases, only MacDonald sought monetary relief
under section 1983 as an alternative to fifth amendment just compensation. 106
S. Ct. at 2565 n.5.
68. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The Williamson County facts revolved around the
application of revised zoning regulations to proposals for the cluster residential
development of a tract of land in Williamson County, Tennessee. Id. at 175.
For a review of the "essence" of the complex facts of this case, see Sallet, supra
note 14, at 645-46. In the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee the suit, which alleged a taking without just compensation, resulted
in a jury award of $350,000 for the temporary taking. 473 U.S. at 182-83. How-
ever, as to the taking claim, the district court granted judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in favor of the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
after reasoning "in part that respondent was unable to derive economic benefit
from its property on a temporary basis only, and that such a temporary depriva-
tion, as a matter of law, cannot constitute a taking." Id. at 183.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by hold-
ing that a governmental regulation "may constitute a taking if the regulation
denies the owner all 'economically viable' use of the land, and that the evidence
supported the jury's finding that the property had no economically feasible use
during the time between the Commission's refusal to approve the preliminary
plat and the jury's verdict." Id. at 183-84. The court of appeals concluded "that
damages are required to compensate for a temporary taking." Id. at 184 (foot-
note omitted). For a discussion of the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals
17
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the Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether the gov-
ernment must pay money damages when private property allegedly has
been taken temporarily by the application of regulations. 69 However,
the Court determined that the claim was not ripe since the landowner
had neither sought variances from the zoning regulations, which might
have been available to allow the proposed development,70 nor had it
sought compensation through available state remedies. 7 1 The Court
reasoned that "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been de-
nied just compensation." 72
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion 73 in which he described
his view of zoning restrictions as "a species of governmental regulation
arguing that a different, less stringent standard should be applied in regulatory
cases than that applied when there has been either a permanent or temporary
physical taking of private property by the government, see Sallet, supra note 14,
at 646-47, 652. For a discussion of other courts which, prior to First English, also
interpreted the fifth amendment as requiring the payment ofjust compensation
in the event of a regulatory taking, see infra note 124.
69. 473 U.S. at 185.
70. Id. at 186-91. The Court relied on its prior determinations that a regu-
latory taking claim is not ripe for the Court's review "until the government en-
tity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Id. at 186
(citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
294, 297 (1981) (concluding that lower court's holding that mere enactment of
state surface mining statute effected a taking in violation of fifth amendment was
fatally deficient because claim did not identify any property that was actually
taken and complainants had not "availed themselves of the opportunities pro-
vided by the [statute] to obtain administrative relief .... "); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (determining there was no concrete contro-
versy regarding application of zoning ordinance to the Aginses' property be-
cause they had not submitted any development plan for approval); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978) (finding there had
been no final determination that Landmarks Law would deny approval of all
uses of property since Penn Central had not sought approval for any plan other
than what had been denied)).
To support its conclusion that the remedial question was not ripe for its
review, the Court in Williamson County noted the relevant factors it had consid-
ered in Penn Central and subsequent cases in determining whether a taking had
occurred. 473 U.S. at 191. Those factors included the economic impact of the
challenged action on the property and the extent to which such impact interferes
with the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, which "factors
simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final,
definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the par-
ticular land in question." Id. at 191. Without a final determination as to
whether there had been a taking, the Court could not address the remedial ques-
tion. Id. at 185-86.
71. Id. at 194.
72. Id. at 195.
73. Id. at 202-06 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, also wrote a separate concurring opinion on the ripeness issue. Id.
at 201 (Brennan, J., concurring). However, he expressly stated that he con-
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that may impair the value of private property . . .in one of two ways,"
which he categorized as "permanent harms" which "may permanently
curtail the economic value of the property," and "temporary harms"
which "may temporarily deprive the owner of a fair return on his invest-
ment."7 4 He divided temporary harms "into two broad subcategories:
(1) those that result from a deliberate decision to appropriate certain
property for public use for a limited period of time; and (2) those that
are a by-product of governmental decisionmaking." 75 The temporary
harms alleged by reason of the subject zoning regulations would fall into
the second subcategory. 76 Although a property owner suffering a tem-
porary harm in the second category may have a claim based on a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process, 7 7 Justice
Stevens saw no basis for any recovery if fair procedures were
employed. 78
Next, the appeal of MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,79
curred without any departure from his San Diego dissent. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
74. Id. at 202 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 203-04 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens also divided per-
manent harms into three subcategories, which he characterized as those that
"may be impermissible even if the Government is willing to pay for them," those
that "may be permissible provided that the property owner is compensated for
his loss" and those that "may be permissible even if no compensation at all is
paid." Id. at 202 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). He saw the per-
manent harm that could result from the subject zoning regulations as falling into
either the second or third category. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). However,
since the landowner had not pursued its available remedies, the Court had noth-
ing on which to base a determination that compensation must be paid (if the
regulations fell into the second category) or that no compensation was payable
(if the regulations fell into the third category). Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 204 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Justice Stevens did not
designate it as such, his suggestion is that a landowner, who suffers a temporary
harm by a deprivation of due process at the hands of state or local government,
should pursue the remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 473 U.S.
at 205 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. 473 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion presented a strong argument that mere invalidation of a regulation is a
satisfactory remedy for an affected property owner when fair procedures are ad-
hered to in the administration and enforcement of regulations. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring). He stated:
We must presume that regulatory bodies such as zoning boards, school
boards, and health boards, generally make a good-faith effort to ad-
vance the public interest when they are performing their official duties,
but we must also recognize that they will often become involved in con-
troversies that they will ultimately lose. Even though these controver-
sies are costly and temporarily harmful to the private citizen, as long as
fair procedures are followed, I do not believe there is any basis in the
Constitution for characterizing the inevitable byproduct of every such
dispute as a "taking" of private property.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). The MacDonald case arose after the Yolo
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presented the Court with the question of whether a taking without just
compensation occurred by reason of the rejection of an owner's subdivi-
sion proposal.8 0 "Because of the importance of the question whether a
monetary remedy in inverse condemnation is constitutionally required
in appropriate cases involving regulatory takings, [the Court] noted
probable jurisdiction" for the appeal of MacDonald.8 1 However, after
further consideration, a majority of the Court determined that again the
remedial question was not ripe for the Court's adjudication. 82
Contrary to the majority's view, Justice White read the factual alle-
gations in the lower opinions as stating a takings claim8 3 and, thus, ad-
County Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors of the County re-
jected a development proposal for a residential subdivision. Id. at 2563. The
landowner reacted by filing an action for an alleged regulatory taking, seeking
declaratory and monetary relief under the fifth amendment or, alternatively,
under section 1983. Id. at 2564-65 & nn.4-5. In addition, the landowner filed a
petition for a writ of mandate that the Board of Supervisors be ordered to set
aside its decision and to reconsider the landowner's proposal, which petition was
still pending when the Court heard the appeal in the action seeking declaratory
and monetary relief. Id. at 2563. The California Superior Court first rejected
the landowner's claims that the County's development restrictions appropriated
the entire economic use of the landowner's property and then "concluded that,
irrespective of the insufficiency of appellant's factual allegations, monetary dam-
ages for inverse condemnation are foreclosed by the California Supreme Court's
decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon." Id. at 2564 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon,
24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255
(1980)).
The California Court of Appeal affirmed based on the California Supreme
Court's decision in Agins that the awarding of compensation pursuant to an in-
verse condemnation action is not an appropriate remedy in the event of a regu-
latory taking. Id. at 2565. The court determined that, even if inverse
condemnation were an available action, the landowner in this case would not be
entitled to monetary relief since a denial of intensive development "cannot be
equated with a refusal to permit any development." Id. For the same reasons,
the court rejected the landowner's section 1983 claim. Id. n.5.
80. Id. at 2562-63.
81. Id. at 2565-66.
82. Id. at 2566-69. The Court noted that the landowner's claim required
the landowner to establish first that the regulation had effected a taking of the
landowner's property and then to demonstrate that the government had not
provided just compensation. Id. at 2566. The MacDonald Court read the state
courts' opinions as indicating that the possibility existed for some permissible
development since the County Planning Commission had not made a final deter-
mination as to how it would apply the subject regulations to the complainant's
property. Accordingly, the Court could determine neither whether a taking had
in fact occurred nor whether the County had failed to pay just compensation. Id.
at 2568-69. Therefore, since the initial question of whether the regulation had
effected a taking was open, the Court could not proceed to the remedial ques-
tion. Id.
83. Id. at 2569-74 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger joined in
Justice White's dissent. Id. at 2569. Justices Powell and Rehnquist also joined as
to Part I (arguing that remedial question was ripe for Court's resolution in this
case), Part II (concluding that landowner had sufficiently alleged final decision
on its takings claim) and Part III (expressly stating that land use regulations may
effect taking and that this challenger had sufficiently alleged such a taking). Id.
944
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dressed both prongs of the regulatory taking issue.8 4 Relying on Justice
Brennan's dissent in San Diego, Justice White affirmatively answered the
first prong by clearly stating "that land use restrictions may constitute a
taking under the Constitution" and that the appellant had adequately
alleged a takings claim. 85 With respect to the second prong, the reme-
dial issue, Justice White determined that a state may not limit the avail-
able remedies to declaratory and injunctive relief when the landowner's
property effectively has been taken by a regulation in violation of the
fifth amendment. 86 "Even where a property owner is deprived of its
property only temporarily, if that deprivation amounts to a taking the
Constitution requires that just compensation be paid." 8 7
III. First English
Within a year after MacDonald, the Court heard the appeal of First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church (the Church), which had alleged a
regulatory taking and was seeking to recover damages in inverse con-
demnation. 88 The Church owned twenty-one acres on which it operated
at 2569-73 (White, J., dissenting). However, Justices Powell and Rehnquist did
not join Part IV in which Justice White expressed his opinion that the Constitu-
tion requires the payment of just compensation even for a temporary property
deprivation. Id. at 2573 (White, J., dissenting). Nor did they join his argument
in Part V that at least the judgment of the court of appeal should be vacated and
the case be remanded. Id. at 2574 (White, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2572-74 (White, J., dissenting). The first prong, whether a takings
cause of action was stated, consisted of two parts. The first part asked
"[w]hether a land use regulation restricting the use of the property may ever
amount to a taking," then, if so, the second part asked "whether the allegations
here are sufficient to state a takings claim." Id. at 2572 (White, J., dissenting).
The second prong questioned "whether a State can limit to declaratory and in-
junctive relief the remedies available to a person whose property has been taken
by regulation or whether the state must pay compensation." Id. at 2573 (White,
J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2573 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (White,J., dissenting). Justice White again expressed his agreement
with Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent.
87. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
88. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2383. Specifically, the Church requested the
Court to hold that the California Supreme Court erred in its Agins decision by
maintaining that the fifth amendment does not require the payment of compen-
sation in the event of a temporary regulatory taking. Id. The Church sought
relief from the Court after the Court of Appeal of California for the Second
Appellate District affirmed the Superior Court of California's decision to grant a
motion to strike the Church's allegations and the California Supreme Court de-
nied review. Id. at 2382-83. Based on Agins, the trial court required a plaintiff to
seek declaratory relief or mandamus when challenging an ordinance that alleg-
edly deprived the plaintiff total use of the plaintiff's land. Id. at 2382. However,
the Church sought only monetary compensation under an inverse condemnation
claim. Accordingly, the trial court deemed the Church's allegations that the or-
dinance denied it all use of Lutherglen to be irrelevant. Id. The California
Court of Appeal classified the complaint as "seeking damages for the uncom-
pensated taking of all use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855 ......
21
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a campground known as "Lutherglen," which served as a retreat center
and as a recreational area for handicapped children. 89 Following a
storm that caused Mill Creek to overflow its banks, flooding Lutherglen
and destroying its buildings, the County of Los Angeles responded with
an ordinance establishing an interim flood protection area. 90 The ordi-
nance prohibited any construction within the interim flood protection
area, 9 1 which included the flat areas on either side of Mill Creek where
the Church's buildings had stood. 92
Less than two months after the county adopted the ordinance, the
Church brought suit against the County of Los Angeles and the Los An-
geles County Flood Control District claiming that the ordinance denied
it all use of Lutherglen and that it was entitled to recover in inverse
condemnation. 93 Following the unfavorable decisions of the California
Id. Therefore, it too relied on Agins in affirming the trial court's decision to
strike the allegations. Id. at 2382-83. The court determined it was "obligated to
follow Agins because the United States Supreme Court ha[d] not yet ruled on the
question of whether a state may constitutionally limit the remedy for a taking to
nonmonetary relief .. " Id. at 2383 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 2381. The National Forest Service owned a watershed area which
naturally drained into the Middle Fork River, along the banks of which lay the
Church's property. Id.
90. Id. at 2381-82. The county enacted the ordinance effective immediately
in the interest of preserving the public's health and safety. Id.
91. Id. Interim Ordinance No. 11,855, adopted by the County of Los Ange-
les six months after the flooding in January, 1979, "provided that '[a] person
shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any
portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the
interim flood protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon.... .Id. (citation
omitted).
92. Id. at 2382. It is unclear from the Court's opinion whether the ordi-
nance affected, and thereby prohibited any building on, all of the Church's 21
acres or only the 12 flat acres on which the Church's buildings stood prior to the
flood. See id. at 2381. The answer to that question may affect the determination
of whether the ordinance in fact effected a taking, which the Court directed to be
resolved on remand. Id. at 2384-85. On remand, the Church must prove that
the ordinance "actually denied [it] all use of its property." Id. at 2384. That
issue first requires the relevant property to be established since, under an analy-
sis pursuant to Keystone or Penn Central, the landowner's entire bundle of prop-
erty rights is to be considered when evaluating the impact of the challenged
regulation. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232,
1248-51 (1987); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
130-31 (1978).
93. 107 S. Ct. at 2384. Specifically, the Church's complaint for inverse con-
demnation alleged:
16
On January 11, 1979, the County adopted Ordinance No. 11,855,
which provides:
"Section 1. A person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge
any building or structure, any portion of which is, or will be, located
within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood protection area
located in Mill Creek Canyon, vicinity of Hidden Springs, as shown on
Map No. 63 ML 52, attached hereto and incorporated herein by refer-
ence as though fully set forth."
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lower courts,94 the Church appealed to the United States Supreme
Court asking it "to hold that the Supreme Court of California erred in
Agins v. Tiburon in determining that the Fifth Amendment, as made appli-
cable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not re-
quire compensation as a remedy for 'temporary' regulatory takings-
those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the
courts."95
The Court initially noted that First English presented it with the re-
medial question ripe for the Court's review, in contrast to the posture in
which MacDonald, Williamson County, San Diego and Agins each had come
before the Court.96 The California appellate court had held "that re-
gardless of the correctness of appellants' [sic] claim that the challenged
ordinance denies it 'all use of Lutherglen' appellant may not recover
damages until the ordinance is finally declared unconstitutional, and
then only for any period after that declaration for which the county
seeks to enforce it."'9 7 Therefore, the Court approached the remedial
question with the assumption that the ordinance denied the Church all
use of Lutherglen. 9 8 This assumption allowed the Court to proceed di-
rectly to the remedial question, although the threshold issue of whether
the regulation had effected a taking "or whether the county might avoid
the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing
that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority
to enact safety regulations" would remain open for the lower court's
17
Lutherglen is within the flood protection area created by Ordi-
nance No. 11,855.
18
Ordinance No. 11,855 denies First Church all use of Lutherglen.
Id. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 2382-83. For a discussion of the lower courts' decisions, see supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 2383. Governmental regulatory action that effects a taking is tem-
porary in that "[o]nce a court determines that a taking has occurred, the govern-
ment retains the whole range of options already available-amendment of the
regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent do-
main." Id. at 2389.
96. Id. at 2383-84. The Court summarized that there was no final determi-
nation on the remedial issue by the lower courts for its review in MacDonald,
Williamson County and San Diego because of factual disputes yet to be resolved in
each of those cases that might result in the conclusion that the subject regula-
tions had not effected a taking. Id. at 2383 (citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 437 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)). In Agins, since the Court concluded
that no taking had occurred, it had no occasion to address the remedial ques-
tion. Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
97, Id. at 2384. Thus, the Court determined that the California Court of
Appeal had made a final determination and had isolated the constitutional reme-
dial question for the Court's review. Id.
98. Id. at 2384-85.
1988] NOTE 947
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determination on remand. 99 The concept that a land use regulation of
limited duration, which effectively denies a landowner all use of its prop-
erty, may constitute a taking is implicit in the Court's assumption. 0 0
Turning to the remedial question, the Court examined the perti-
nent language of the fifth amendment: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."'' 0 As the Court rec-
ognized, the language secures compensation to the landowner in the
event of a governmental taking, but it does not prohibit the government
from taking private property. 10 2 Given the "self-executing charac-
99. Id. Without this assumption, the Court faced the same dilemma in First
English as posed in MacDonald, Williamson County and San Diego: there had been
no final determination in the lower courts as to whether the ordinance had ef-
fected a taking. Id. at 2383. However, to get past that obstacle, the Court read
the lower court's opinion as isolating the remedial question. Id. at 2384. This
approach made possible the Court's consideration of the remedial question even
though further proceedings on the facts of First English would be necessary in the
lower courts to establish whether a taking had in fact occurred.
In a footnote, the Court also recognized that First English was not burdened
with another obstacle present in prior cases-the requirement that the com-
plainant exhaust its available remedies at the state level before the claim is ripe
for the Court's review. Id. n.6. Since the California courts found, on the basis of
Agins, that inverse condemnation is not an action available to the landowner al-
leging an unconstitutional regulation, the Court believed the compensation
claim was ripe for its consideration. Id.
100. The Court did not expressly state that a regulation may effect a taking.
However, the initial question "may a regulatory action effect a taking" must be
answered in the affirmative if the Court's First English decision is to have any
meaning. If the answer were negative, there would be no need for the Court in
First English to answer the second question affirmatively-that if a regulatory ac-
tion does effect a taking, just compensation is the demanded remedy under the
fifth amendment. A negative answer to the second question-"if a regulatory
action may and does effect a taking, is just compensation the constitutionally
required remedy under the fifth amendment"-likely would have induced the
Court to address the alternative remedy of damages under a section 1983 action
for an alleged deprivation of due process in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. For a discussion of section 1983 being advocated by many as the appro-
priate remedy for an excessive regulation, see supra note 67 and infra note 148
and accompanying text.
101. Id. at 2385 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
102. Id. at 2385; accord Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) ("The Fifth Amendment does not pro-
scribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.");
Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 n.40
(1981) (same); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (government
has "constitutional obligation to pay just compensation for the value" of prop-
erty taken under fifth amendment); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932)
(when government takes property without exercising its power of eminent do-
main, landowner has means of securing compensation by way of action in in-
verse condemnation); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 336 (1893) (government's power to regulate commerce is subject to fifth
amendment and if in exercising that power government takes private property,
government must pay just compensation for what it takes); United States v.
Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883) ("The power to take private property for public
uses, generally termed the right of eminent domain, belongs to every independ-
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ter"'10 3 of the just compensation clause, whenever there is a taking, the
Constitution requires compensation as the appropriate remedy. 10 4 In
First English, the Court interpreted the mandate of the fifth amendment
as extending to a "temporary" regulatory taking and concluded that the
fifth amendment requires compensation for temporary regulatory tak-
ings just as it does for permanent and temporary physical takings.' 0 5
The Court reasoned that, once a regulation "goes too far"10 6 and effects
a taking, mere invalidation of the regulation "though converting the tak-
ing into a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the de-
mands of the Just Compensation Clause."' 1 7 Specifically, the Court
held "that where the government's activities have already worked a tak-
ing of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective."' 0 8
Anticipating the debates that the decision would stimulate, the
Court expressly cautioned that its holding was limited to the facts of the
ent government .... The provision . . .for just compensation ... is merely a
limitation .... It is no part of the power itself, but a condition upon which the
power may be exercised.").
103. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting 6 P. NICH-
OLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972)). The Court regards the just
compensation clause as self executing because "[s]tatutory recognition [is] not
necessary. A promise to pay [is] not necessary. Such a promise to pay [is] im-
plied because of the duty imposed by the [Fifth] Amendment." First English, 107
S. Ct. at 2386 (quotingJacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)).
104. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386. This understanding prevailed in the
context of prior Court decisions involving governmental appropriation of pri-
vate property, whether of permanent or temporary duration, pursuant to inverse
condemnation actions as well as formal eminent domain proceedings. See Kirby
Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984) (determining date on
which physical taking of private property for national preserve occurred where
government was responsible for payment of just compensation for permanent
taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256.(1946) (concluding that govern-
ment must pay just compensation for easement it acquired through landowner's
air space whether easement is found to be permanent or temporary); see also
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (fifth amendment imposes duty to
pay just compensation for a taking regardless of whether government institutes
condemnation proceedings or property owners bring action in inverse condem-
nation). For a discussion of inverse condemnation as distinguished from emi-
nent domain, see supra note 43.
105. 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
106. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For a dis-
cussion of Pennsylvania Coal, see supra notes 18, 24-25 and accompanying text.
107. 107 S. Ct. at 2388. The Court thus adopted a position contrary to the
California Supreme Court's finding in Agins that inverse condemnation is not an
appropriate remedial action when a regulatory taking is alleged. Id. at 2389.
The Court literally interpreted Justice Holmes' warning that "if a regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." See Pennmylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at
415. Once an action is deemed to be a taking, the fifth amendment requires
payment of just compensation. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
108. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
9491988] NOTE
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case.10 9 The Court concluded with a recognition that its decision would
restrict "the freedom and flexibility" of those land-use planners and en-
tities enacting land-use regulation, but noted that the imposition of
those restrictions was justified since "such consequences necessarily
flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right."' 1 0
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens did not accept the
Church's allegations in the pleadings that the ordinance denied it all use
of Lutherglen so as to constitute a taking for which the fifth amendment
requires payment of just compensation.' 1 ' Justice Stevens maintained
that the taking claim should be summarily rejected on its merits since
"the type of regulatory program at issue here cannot constitute a tak-
ing." 1 12 Accordingly, without an affirmative answer to the initial ques-
tion of whether the regulation in fact had effected a taking, Justice
Stevens saw First English as another case in which the Court was pre-
cluded from reaching the remedial issue.1 13
Justice Stevens further argued that there are differences between
regulatory takings and physical takings."14 However, he reluctantly ac-
knowledged that the consequences of some temporary regulations may
be so severe that invalidation or repeal will not be sufficient to eliminate
a taking label." t5 In those situations, Justice Stevens suggested that the
Court must consider not only the important diminution in value inquiry,
109. Id. The Court cautioned that cases involving delays in the issuance of
building permits or changes in zoning ordinances would present different ques-
tions than those addressed in First English. Id.
110. Id.; accord Bauman, supra note 6, at 99 ("The Constitution was never
meant to make things easy but to make them right.").
111. 107 S. Ct. at 2391, 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2391. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor
joined Justice Stevens in this position although they did not join in the entire
dissent. Justice Stevens found support for this position in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). Keystone involved a regula-
tory taking claim which the Court had considered just prior to First English. Id. at
1236. Although Keystone presented a factual situation very similar to Pennsylvania
Coal, the Court upheld the challenged act and regulations as a valid exercise of
the state's police powers to prevent public nuisances. Id. at 1240. In accordance
with Keystone, Justice Stevens in his First English dissent argued that the govern-
ment may not be burdened with a compensation obligation when it enacts regu-
lations designed to protect the health and safety of the community. First English,
107 S. Ct. at 2391-92 (Stevens,J., dissenting); accord Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887).
113. 107 S. Ct. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2393-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor did not join this argument. Justice Stevens saw a difference since
"virtually all physical invasions are deemed takings . . . [but] a regulatory pro-
gram that adversely affects property values does not constitute a taking unless it
destroys a major portion of the property's value." Id. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
115. Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed that when a regula-
tion goes too far, "the Government has a choice: it may abandon the regulation
or it may continue to regulate and compensate those whose property it takes."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, contrary to the majority's position, he
950
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but also the amount of the landowner's property which is affected and
the duration of the restriction.' 16 He argued that, rather than the just
compensation clause of the fifth amendment, it is the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment which provides protection to the property
owner if the owner is entitled to any protection at all." 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF FIRST ENGLISH
The First English decision seems to provide the conclusion to a sim-
ple syllogism:
1. The fifth amendment conditions the taking of private property
on the payment of just compensation." 18
2. A regulatory action may constitute a taking of private
property. 119
3. Just compensation is the constitutionally required remedy for a
regulation that effects a taking of private property. 120
However, this represents a long, controversial struggle by the Court, not
only as to the conclusion on the just compensation issue, but also as to
the determination that a regulation may effect a taking.' 2
urged that "[iun the usual case, either of these options is wholly satisfactory." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2393-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the remedies
available under the fourteenth amendment in a section 1983 action, see supra
note 67 and infra note 148 and accompanying text.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the First English Court's discussion of the
fifth amendment, see infra note 125 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of those cases in which the Court has addressed the
possibility that a regulatory action may effect a taking, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121 (1985).
120. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389; see also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656-57 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
The First English decision specifically addressed the remedy for "temporary"
regulatory takings, which the Court defined as "those regulatory takings which
are ultimately invalidated by the courts." 107 S. Ct. at 2383. The Court's em-
phasis on temporary regulatory takings begs the question-what about permanent
regulatory takings? However, the definition assumes that a regulation will be
invalidated and thus become temporary once the judiciary determines that the
regulation effected a taking. See Williams, supra note 14, at 222-23. Based on
that assumption, land-use regulations which are allowed to remain permanently
or to continue indefinitely will be those that are found to be proper exercises of
the police power that do not effect a taking and, accordingly, are not invalidated;
therefore, by definition, there can be no such action as a permanent regulatory
taking.
121. See Bauman, supra note 6, at 16. As Mr. Bauman pointed out several
years before the First English decision:
[11f a land use regulation can be held by a court to be so harsh as to
effect a taking, is just compensation the required constitutional remedy,
or is invalidation of the offending regulation sufficient? While the ex-
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At least since Mugler v. Kansas,122 a century before First English, the
Court debated whether a regulatory action may effect a taking of private
property. Early in the debate, the answer appeared to be present injus-
tice Holmes' famous statement for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal that "if
a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 12 3 However,
rather than answering the question, his statement served to spark the
debate. No clear answers were forthcoming because of the uncertainty
as to what constitutes going "too far" and as to whether Justice Holmes
had used the word "taking" in a literal fifth amendment sense or in a
metaphorical sense as a shorthand description of a regulation that is in-
valid because of its impact on the value of private property.12 4 Finally,
press words of the fifth amendment's just compensation clause would
seem to have answered that question easily and long ago, such has not
been the case.
Id.
122. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Mugler Court's view that a "prohibition sim-
ply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation,
to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any
just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit," id. at 668-69, can be compared with the First English Court's discussion
of the meaning of the fifth amendment: "[I]t is designed not to limit the govern-
mental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation
in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." First Eng-
lish, 107 S. Ct. at 2386 (emphasis in original).
123. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For a dis-
cussion of Pennsylvania Coal, see supra notes 18 and 24-25 and accompanying
text.
124. Williams, supra note 14, at 208-14 (arguing that in Pennsylvania Coal
Justice Holmes used word "taking" metaphorically to describe effect of public
action on value of property and not literally in constitutional sense). Contra First
English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386-87 (established doctrine since Pennsylvania Coal that
taking is to be recognized when government denies landowner all use of land);
San Diego, 450 U.S. at 649 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[metaphorical] view
ignores the coal company's repeated claim before the Court that the Penn-
sylvania statute took its property withoutjust compensation"); Berger & Kanner,
supra note 3, at 726-28 (responding to Williams, supra note 14, that whether
Holmes used "taking" metaphorically is irrelevant; rather it is Court's subse-
quent decisions that just compensation is constitutionally mandated for takings
that are relevant to determining Court's intent).
Since the Court's decisions failed to provide clear guidance on the issue of
regulatory takings, some state courts refused to recognize takings in the regula-
tory context, while others recognized that a regulation may effect a taking re-
quiring the payment of compensation. For example, the Court of Appeals of
New York read Pennsylvania Coal as addressing an excessive exercise of the police
regulatory power in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Fred F. French In-
vesting Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). As opposed to when the government physi-
cally appropriates private property for public use, in which case the government
must pay just compensation,
when there is only regulation of the uses of private property, no com-
pensation need be paid. Of course, and this is often the beginning of
confusion, a purported "regulation" may impose so onerous a burden
on the property regulated that it has, in effect, deprived the owner of
the reasonable income productive or other private use of his property
[Vol. 33: p. 925
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the First English decision settled the debate by implicitly holding that a
regulation may go so far as to in fact effect a taking.
Upon application of the taking label to an excessive regulation, the
Court's answer to the remedial question flows logically from the explicit
language of the fifth amendment: once a taking of private property has
occurred, the government must pay the landowner just compensation
for what has been taken. 125 The First English decision reflects the
Court's desire to heed Justice Holmes' warning that "[w]e are in danger
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition
is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." 1 2 6 In First English, the
Court commits itself to the constitutional mandate of requiring the gov-
ernment to pay for a taking that results from regulatory actions.' 2 7
and thus has destroyed its economic value. In all but exceptional cases,
nevertheless, such a regulation does not constitute a "taking", and is
therefore not compensable, but amounts to a deprivation or frustration
of property rights without due process of law and is therefore invalid.
Id. at 593-94, 350 N.E.2d at 384-85, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the California position expressed in Agins, which also maintained
that invalidation is the appropriate remedy for an alleged regulatory taking
rather than the payment of compensation under the fifth amendment, see supra
notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire followed a literal reading of Penn-
sylvania Coal when it reviewed a claim of inverse condemnation arising in re-
sponse to an amendment of the city of Keene's zoning ordinance. Burrows v.
City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981). The court distinguished rea-
sonable regulations that do not violate either the Constitution of the United
States or the New Hampshire Constitution from those that are "arbitrary or un-
reasonable restrictions which substantially deprive the owner of the 'economi-
cally viable use of his land' in order to benefit the public in some way." Id. at
598, 432 A.2d at 20. The court expressed that, in the latter case, the restrictions
effect a taking and the government must pay compensation. Id. The court
reasoned:
Because the constitution prohibits any taking of private property
by whatever means without compensation, the just compensation re-
quirement applies whenever the exercise of the so-called police power
results in a "taking of property." The government may not do under
an implied power that which it cannot do under an express power. In
other words, it cannot do indirectly that which it cannot do directly.
Id. at 597, 432 A.2d at 19. For a discussion of other state decisions that have
adopted this approach, see Comment, supra note 6, at 1247-49. For discussions
of additional cases, see Bauman, supra note 6, at 47; Berger & Kanner, supra note
3, at 685-86 & n.3; Comment, supra note 6, at 1245.
125. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386. After discussing that the fifth amend-
ment is a condition on the taking of private property by the government rather
than a prohibition against such taking, the Court stated: "Thus, governmental
action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the 'constitu-
tional obligation to pay just compensation.' " Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
126. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
127. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. The Court's application of the just
compensation mandate to the regulatory taking context continues the evolution
of the expanding interpretation of the fifth amendment. The basic, historical
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The First English Court adopted Justice Brennan's position that
mere invalidation of a regulation which has effected a taking "is not a
sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation
Clause."' 128 Invalidation serves only as a prospective remedy for the
landowner; it provides no remedy at all for the denial of all use of pri-
vate property that already has occurred.' 2 9 Once a landowner suffers
the effects of a taking, the fifth amendment's protection is triggered and
"no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide just compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective."130
Unfortunately, the questions left unresolved in Justice Brennan's
San Diego dissent' 3 ' continue to be unresolved. The First English Court
did not discuss any of the open issues raised by numerous commenta-
tors' 32 during the intervening years between San Diego and First English.
The result is that the practical reach of the First English decision is not
application of the just compensation clause arises in the typical taking situation
where the government exercises its power of eminent domain to acquire title to
private property. See, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939) (dis-
cussing valuation of property taken by government through exercise of its emi-
nent domain powers); Comment, supra note 6, at 1238 & nn.3-4 (eminent
domain power exercised by government paying just compensation in exchange
for title). From that beginning point, the Court recognized that the fifth amend-
ment preserved the compensation remedy for a landowner, via an inverse con-
demnation action, when the government's activities effected a physical taking by
denying the landowner all use of private property even though the government
had not accomplished the taking through formal condemnation proceedings.
The next expansion of the fifth amendment's applicability embraced those in-
stances of physical taking by the government for a limited period of time without
exercising its power of eminent domain. For a discussion of those cases involv-
ing a temporary physical appropriation of private property by the government,
see supra note 60 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court adopted a per se
rule that a taking occurs whenever the government enters into, or authorizes a
third party to enter into, a permanent physical occupation of private property.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
For a discussion of Loretto, see supra note 35. Against this background, the Court
in First English took a long step to expand the fifth amendment's protective um-
brella over private property owners to include those temporary periods when
governmental regulations effect a taking without any physical appropriation by
the government.
128. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
129. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 655 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, "mere
invalidation would fall far short of fulfilling the fundamental purpose of the Just
Compensation Clause. That guarantee was designed to bar the government
from forcing some individuals to bear burdens which, in all fairness, should be
borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 656.
130. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
131. For a discussion of the issues left unresolved in the San Diego dissent,
see supra note 65.
132. See, e.g., Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 692-96 (lamenting Court's
"determination to adhere to its 'I know it when I see it' philosophy"); Williams,
supra note 14, at 219-34 (arguing against just compensation in regulatory con-
text because of many unanswered takings questions).
954 [Vol. 33: p. 925
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clear, primarily because the opinion supplies no assistance in under-
standing what in fact constitutes a regulatory taking. In addition, it does
not discuss the appropriate standards by which to determine what
equals just compensation. All that we actually know from First English is
that once a regulatory taking is found, the Constitution demands the
payment ofjust compensation.13 3 However, the understanding of what
constitutes a taking is critical in the regulatory context since there is no
readily identifiable physical appropriation of private property by the
government. 134 Equally important are the standards by which to deter-
minejust compensation, without which the courts will have wide latitude
in calculating just compensation, with the potential result that the com-
pensation awarded to some aggrieved landowners will fall short of being
"just." 135
Two additional land use regulation cases,1 36 which also were
handed down by the Court in 1987, provide some insight into the issue
of what legally constitutes a regulatory taking. Just prior to First English
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,1s7 the Court found
legislation enacted to prevent activities dangerous to the health, safety
and economic welfare of Pennsylvania's citizens to be a valid exercise of
the police power.138 Where such legislation impacts minimally on the
affected property owner, the Court held that it does not constitute an
133. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
134. A factual understanding is critical because of the extreme conse-
quences a takings determination has for both the government and the land-
owner. A valid regulation will be upheld, the government will not pay any
compensation and the landowner will not be entitled to relief. On the other
hand, an invalid regulation that constitutes a taking will be struck down, the
government must abide by the fifth amendment mandate to pay just compensa-
tion and the landowner will recover for the loss of property.
135. SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 604. Although Professor Johnson views
the remedy of invalidation as adequate in most instances, he urges that "[i]f
compensation for burdensome land-use regulation is deemed desirable, entitle-
ment should be based upon criteria that are ascertainable, consistent, and fair."
Id.
136. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). For dis-
cussions of these two cases and First English, see Bozung, The 1987 Land Use
Trilogy: Keystone, First English and Nollan, in TAKINGS, SECTION 1983 AND LAND
USE DISPUTES (Prentice Hall Law & Business 1988) (seminar)'397; Callies, Recent
Supreme Court Cases and Their Impact on MVunicipal Liability, in TAKINGS, SECTION
1983 AND LAND USE DISPUTES (Prentice Hall Law & Business 1988) (seminar)
181; Delaney, An Outline on the Status of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence in Light of
the Supreme Court's 1987 Takings Decisions, in TAKINGS, SECTION 1983 AND LAND
USE DISPUTES (Prentice Hall Law & Business 1988) (seminar) 298; Freilich, Tak-
ings and Growth M'anagement, in TAKINGS, SECTION 1983 AND LAND USE DISPUTES
(Prentice Hall Law & Business 1988) (seminar) 383.
137. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
138. Id. at 1242-46. The Court held that the public interest justification
supported Pennsylvania's exercise of its police powers. Id.
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unconstitutional taking. '3 9 Thus, applying the rationale of Keystone, the
Court would uphold regulations enacted "to arrest what [the legislature]
perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare"140 when that
threat outweighs the impact of the regulation on the affected property
owner.
However, it appears from the post-First English case of Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission 141 that the Court will scrutinize carefully the
public interest justification allegedly promoted by governmental regula-
tions, at least when the regulations involve physical intrusion on private
property and thereby interfere with the landowner's right to exclude
others.' 4 2 The California Coastal Commission attempted to serve the
public by "protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the
public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach cre-
ated by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on public
beaches."' 4 3 To meet those ends, the Commission required private
owners who sought a building permit to grant a public easement across
their property, but did not pay them any compensation.' 44 The Court
concluded that a sufficient relationship was lacking between the imposed
condition and the public interest allegedly advanced by the condi-
tion. 14 5 Absent this required nexus, the Court declared that if a state
139. Id. at 1242. Although the petitioners claimed that the statute in ques-
tion would prevent them from mining almost 27 million tons of coal, the Court
minimized that impact since the 27 million tons represented less than two per-
cent of petitioner's coal. Id. at 1248.
140. Id. In upholding the regulations, the Court distinguished Keystone
from Pennsylvania Coal although the two cases involved substantially similar facts.
Id. at 1243-50. The Court maintained that a distinction existed since the subject
Act in Pennsylvania Coal served only private interests as opposed to the common
welfare protected by the governmental action at issue in Keystone. Id. at 1243.
Also, in Pennsylvania Coal, the Act effectively prohibited the mining of certain
areas of coal, whereas the record in Keystone did not support a similar finding
that the coal companies could not "profitably engage in their business, or that
there [had] been undue interference with their investment-backed expecta-
tions." Id. at 1242. For a discussion of the facts of Pennsylvania Coal, see supra
note 18.
141. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). For a discussion of the facts of Nollan, see
supra note 39.
142. Id. at 3146-50. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority
should have applied a mere rationality standard of review to the condition on
the permit. Id. at 3151-54 & n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, the major-
ity asserted "that this case does not meet even the most untailored standards."
Id. at 3148.
143. Id. at 3147.
144. Id. at 3148.
145. Id. The Court reasoned that if the Commission had made the permit
conditional on some action to protect the public's ability to see the beach, such
as a height restriction, a legitimate state interest would be served. Id. However,
the Court stated that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmen-
tal purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regu-
lation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' " Id. at 3148 (citing
J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15
956 [Vol. 33: p. 925
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wishes to serve such public interests by securing a public easement
across private property, which the Court characterized as an appropria-
tion, the state must pay for the taking.' 4
6
In addition to not defining what constitutes a regulatory taking, the
Court in First English also did not establish the appropriate measure for
determining just compensation when a regulation is held to effect a tak-
ing. 14 7 In the context of temporary regulatory takings, the difficult
questions 1 48 include not only what is the appropriate measure of just
(1981)). The Commission had asserted that the Nollans' house would "interfere
with 'visual access' to the beach" and thus create "a 'psychological barrier' to
,access.' " Id. at 3149. In turn, this would increase the use of the public
beaches. Id. The Court responded that it was impossible to determine that a
requirement to allow people already on public beaches to walk across the Nol-
lans' property would eliminate obstacles to viewing the beaches, reduce psycho-
logical barriers to using the beaches or improve congestion on the beaches. Id.
146. Id. at-3150. The Nollan decision reflects a significantly more restrictive
approach with respect to how paternalistic land regulators may be, as compared
to the broad discretion accorded by the Penn Central decision. Penn Central sup-
ported an extension of the power of official regulators to protect the public from
aesthetic harms, while the Nollan Court was unwilling to allow the regulators to
protect the public from a perceived aesthetic harm by means of a condition un-
related to that goal. Id. This difference may be attributable to the Court's char-
acterization of the condition in Nollan as a "permanent physical occupation." Id.
at 3145. In contrast, the Court characterized the regulation at issue in Penn Cen-
tral as being merely a restriction on use which involved neither a physical intru-
sion by the government nor a complete prohibition on use. Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978). For a discussion
of Penn Central, see supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
147. The temporary nature of regulatory takings presents problems in cal-
culating just compensation that do not arise in typical, physical appropriations
when the government acquires title to the property it takes or occupies property
for a limited period of time. In those cases, the fair market value at the time of
the taking is recognized generally as the appropriate measure ofjust compensa-
tion for the property interest taken. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). For a discussion of the problems with measuring
damages in the regulatory taking context, see Sallet, supra note 14, at 652-53;
Williams, supra note 14, at 223-25.
148. These difficulties support the position of those who urge that the just
compensation clause is not the appropriate constitutional remedy for an exces-
sive regulatory action. Rather, they assert that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protects landowners against excessive regulation. See
generally Bauman, supra note 6, at 56-58 (damages for section 1983 violation);
Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings," 8 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 541-44 (1981) (compensation under fourteenth amend-
ment and section 1983); Johnson, supra note 2, at 598-602 (same); Mandelker,
supra note 43, at 506-12 (section 1983 remedies analogous to constitutional rem-
edies); Comment,Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages
Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REV. 711, 723 n.69 (1982)
(same). In a section 1983 action based on deprivation of due process in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, the successful challenger would be entitled
to money damages for the economic harm suffered rather than to just compen-
sation. Id. For a comparison of the just compensation and due process clauses,
see Carlisle, supra note 67, at 569-77.
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compensation, 149 but also when did the temporary taking begin 15 0 and
what was the property interest taken.' 5 '
The First English decision does not discuss the possibility of money
damages under a section 1983 action as an alternative or supplemental
remedy to the just compensation remedy in the regulatory context.
Thus, it is unclear whether just compensation under the fifth amend-
ment is the exclusive remedy available once a regulatory action has been
labeled a "taking" or whether a section 1983 action may be pursued in
lieu of, or in addition to, a direct claim under the fifth amendment.
1 52
In light of the unknown criteria that must be established to demonstrate
a regulatory taking and to determine just compensation, it is suggested
that challengers should seek just compensation and section 1983 dam-
ages either concurrently or alternatively. ' 5 3
Despite the unresolved issues after First English, the case does offer
landowners who challenge excessive regulations the potential for mone-
tary compensation rather than merely the inadequate remedy of invali-
dation. It is submitted that the First English decision may encourage
official land planners to be more responsible in performance of their
duties in the public interest when faced with potential monetary liability
where before the only risk was of a regulation being invalidated. 154 If
149. For a discussion of the question regarding the appropriate measure of
just compensation, see supra note 65. For a suggestion that the lower courts
should determine the amount of just compensation on a case-by-case basis, see
Comment, supra note 6, at 1259-63.
150. For a discussion of the commencement date issue, see supra note 65;
D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOP-
MENT 85 (2d ed. Supp. 1987).
151. It has been suggested that the interest taken by an excessive regula-
tion "is a 'negative easement' or 'servitude.' " D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNING-
HAM, supra note 150, at 85.
152. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 150, at 86. For the text
of section 1983, see supra note 67.
153. See Bauman, supra note 6, at 57-58. In Burrows v. City of Keene, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court awarded the landowner both just compensation
for a regulatory taking and section 1983 damages for costs and attorneys' fees.
121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981). For discussions of Burrows, see Gordon,
supra note 2, at 222-23; supra note 124.
"[O]ne advantage of the [section 1983] remedy is that claims can more eas-
ily be made for consequential damages, punitive damages against malicious offi-
cials and attorneys' fees." Bauman, supra note 6, at 57. In addition, under a
section 1983 action, there would be no need to identify the property interest
taken although it still would be necessary to find when the alleged harm to the
landowner began in order to determine the actual loss suffered. D. MANDELKER
& R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 150, at 86; see also Johnson, supra note 2, at 599
(section 1983 damages focus on "the full range of damages suffered"). How-
ever, Professor Johnson believes that section 1983 actions would prove to be
less successful than takings claims. Id. at 600.
154. See Comment, supra note 148, at 731 ("some threat of fiscal liability
can be beneficial as an incentive to responsible public planning"). In addition to
risking governmental financial liability, municipal officials who act irresponsibly
with regard to land-use regulations also may risk the security of their elected or
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this results in "a chilling effect upon the exercise of police regulatory
powers at the local level," 155 perhaps that is necessary in order to insure
that official land planners function not only with a concern for the public
welfare, but also with a respect for the rights of private property owners.
The long-term effect of First English may be that regulators will live
up to the. expectation of many that municipal officials, in good faith, en-
act land use regulations to serve legitimate public interests. 15 6 Other
recent Court decisions indicate that the Court will find a taking when the
nexus between the regulation and the public interest is tenuous or non-
existent so that the government's objectives would be more appropri-
ately effectuated by an exercise of its eminent domain powers and the
payment of just compensation. 15 7 However, the Court will not find a
regulatory taking where the government seeks to protect the public from
a dangerous activity by means of a restriction that does not impact se-
verely on the landowner.158
As to the landowner/developer, does the First English decision sup-
ply that person or entity with "the coercive threat of a compensation
remedy as a lever with which to pry loose regulatory relief from a reluc-
appointed positions. Voters/taxpayers will likely be reluctant to bear the bur-
den through their tax payments for any just compensation award for which the
municipality is held liable. On the other hand, it is ironic that those local resi-
dents who subscribe to the "not in my backyard" approach to protest a land-
owner's development of property may now be the taxpayers who ultimately are
bearing the financial burden of compensating the landowner when a regulation
goes so far that it effects a taking. Perhaps, they too will be encouraged to con-
sider more carefully the need to strike a balance between their concerns and the
rights of an individual property owner. See generally id. at 729-31; Bauman, supra
note 6, at 85-91.
155. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372, 377 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
156. Compare Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 205 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[R]egulatory bodies ... generally make a good-faith effort to advance the pub-
lic interest when they are performing their official duties.") and Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) ("[G]overnment regulation-by definition-involves the
adjustment of rights for the public good.") and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 414 (1915) ("We must accord good faith to the city in the absence of a clear
showing to the contrary and an honest exercise of judgment upon the circum-
stances which induced its action.") with Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 733-37
(motives underlying regulations are often "considerably less than in 'good
faith' ") and Williams, supra note 14, at 201-02 ("[The] assumption that local
government is often arbitrary in dealing with the developers is by no means
groundless. No one with first-hand experience in the field would deny that mu-
nicipal caprice is far more common than it should be.").
157. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). For a
discussion of Nollan, in which the Court rejected the conditioning of a building
permit on an easement requirement unconnected to a legitimate public interest
justification, see supra notes 39 & 141-46 and accompanying text.
158. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232
(1987). For a discussion of Keystone, in which the Court upheld, as valid regula-
tory actions, statutes that prohibited mining of underlying coal supports, see
supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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tant local government?"' 59 The submitted answer for the long term is
no. It is in developers' interest to submit plans that reflect due consider-
ation for the concerns of official land planners and members of the com-
munity, since developers want to spend their efforts, time and money
pursuing their development businesses rather than litigating where the
line should be drawn between a taking and a valid regulation. 160
Although the availability of compensation under the fifth amendment
for a regulatory action that effected a taking is far more satisfactory than
mere invalidation of the regulation, development, rather than compen-
sation, is the developer's primary goal.
Furthermore, a property owner alleging a regulatory taking will
continue to face a formidable challenge in establishing that a regulation
has in fact effected a taking which requires the payment ofjust compen-
sation.' 6 ' If and when the owner succeeds in establishing regulatory
action sufficient to bring the owner's loss within the protection of the
fifth amendment, First English provides the monetary remedy for the
deprivation of all use suffered by the landowner-a remedy which has
been deemed to be constitutionally secured. 162
V. CONCLUSION
Following many years of speculation and uncertainty, the Court in
First English has adopted the position that, if a regulatory action effects a
taking of private property for public use, the fifth amendment demands
the payment of just compensation. 163 Nevertheless, the effect of the
First English decision will be tempered by what the Court ultimately char-
acterizes as a regulatory taking. It is likely that the Court will award
compensation under the fifth amendment in the regulatory context only
when a regulation has gone so far as to deny an owner all use of private
property so that the Court has no choice but to label it a taking. 164
Once labeled a taking, the government's action is subject to the mandate
of the fifth amendment.
159. Williams, supra note 14, at 207.
160. Developers will be reluctant to engage in litigation with local munici-
palities not only for reasons related to the subject project, but also because of
their need for a satisfactory, ongoing, working relationship with governmental
agencies as to the developers' future projects. See Bauman, supra note 6, at 58
n.228 (noting importance of good working relationships between developers
and public officials); Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 752 (urging that property
owners want to use their property rather than engage in lawsuits). But see Wil-
liams, supra note 14, at 207 (arguing that developers will use threat of litigation
for just compensation as lever against opposing regulators).
161. See Callies, supra note 136, at 205; Williams, supra note 14, at 238.
162. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
163. Id.
164. See Williams, supra note 14, at 238 ("The most likely judicial course
will be to deny compensation, except in the most extreme cases, through deci-
sions that moot the confrontation by avoiding decisions on constitutional
grounds.").
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In the interim, before such a decision is issued, the effects of First
English will be experienced at the local level. The predicted ramifica-
tions on the land-use regulatory process include "a significant adverse
impact" resulting in the failure of cautious local officials and land-use
planners to enact health and safety regulations, 16 5 limitations on the
freedom and flexibility required by local governments to carry out their
functions, 166 "quick and combative confrontation followed by an accom-
modation that can only weaken the land use process"' 16 7 and "a chilling
effect upon the exercise of police regulatory powers at a local level be-
cause the expenditure of public funds would be, to some extent, within
the power of the judiciary." 168 In addition, it is anticipated that the de-
cision "will generate a great deal of litigation" 169 while strapping fiscally
limited municipalities with the financial burden of defending the in-
creased litigation. 170 However, the effect of First English may be much
more positive. It may result in the striking of a healthy balance between
land planning officials concerned with the public welfare and landown-
ers vested with individual property rights protected by the
Constitution. '71
Increased litigation should be anticipated in the short term until
there are more judicial decisions drawing the line between valid regula-
tions and regulatory takings. Without such judicial decisions there are
few parameters to guide official land planners. When those decisions
are made, officials will be aided, but their dilemma will not disappear for
it is highly improbable that there will ever be a clear definition of what
constitutes a regulatory taking. 172
165. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2390, 2399-400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-78, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
167. Williams, supra note 14, at 237.
168. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
169. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord Wil-
liams, supra note 14, at 237.
170. See Williams, supra note 14, at 203-04.
171. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661
n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he threat of financial liability for un-
constitutional police power regulations would help to produce a more rational
basis of decisionmaking that weighs the costs of restrictions against their bene-
fits"). See generally Bauman, supra note 6, at 99 ("Questions of takings and com-
pensation remedies require a balancing of public responsibility and individual
rights, tempered by a constitutionally sanctioned sensitivity to what is just and
fair to the community of one. The Constitution was never meant to make things
easy but to make them right."); Gordon, supra note 2, at 228 ("The ultimate goal
of the 'compensation for regulatory taking remedy' is to make government fully
responsible for its regulatory actions to the extent that such actions have had a
confiscatory impact on the property rights of private landowners.").
172. In his San Diego dissent,Justice Brennan noted that "one distinguished
commentator has characterized the attempt to differentiate 'regulation' from
'taking' as 'the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contempo-
rary land-use law ... one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's
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It is suggested that the gray area distinguishing a valid regulation
from a regulatory taking will remain. Courts will have the final responsi-
bility of upholding, as proper exercises of the police power, those regu-
lations which merely restrict property uses for the good of the general
public. On the other hand, the courts' responsibility will include declar-
ing as takings those exercises of the police power that are improper be-
cause they deprive a landowner all use of private property or attempt to
stretch "too far" the public interest justification. However dismal that
gray area looms over the land planning process for those whose regula-
tory decisions are subject to a fifth amendment challenge, which may
result in liability for payment of compensation, the First English decision
does hold out the long overdue, bright relief of just compensation for
the landowner who suffers an unconstitutional regulatory taking.
Anne E. Sheppard
hunt for the quark.' " San Diego, 450 U.S. at 649-50 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976)).
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